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CASENOTES 
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY LAW-A PERSONAL GUARANTEE 
FROM A CORPORATE INSIDER MAY MEAN THAT PAY-
MENTS RECEIVED BY THE LENDER WITHIN ONE YEAR 
PRIOR TO THE DEBTOR'S FILING FOR INSOLVENCY ARE 
SUBJECT TO AN EXTENDED PREFERENCE PERIOD AND RE-
COVER Y FROM THE LENDER. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial 
Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). 
A recent Seventh Circuit opinion may mean lenders everywhere 
should more carefully consider accepting personal guarantees as a form 
of credit support. Lenders often are exposed to uncertainty concerning 
possible avoidance by trustees of payments made by debtors within 
ninety days of the debtors' entry into bankruptcy. A federal appeals 
court, applying a literal interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, has ex-
tended that period of uncertainty to one year for lenders holding personal 
guarantees from business "insiders.") This Note discusses the legal basis 
of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial 
Corp.2 and its potential implications for lenders. 
Insiders guaranteed the debts of a corporation awarded a contract to 
construct an extension of Chicago's subway system to O'Hare Airport. 3 
Experiencing serious financial and legal difficulties, the corporation failed 
to complete the subway line, despite substantial loans from a number of 
sources.4 In 1983 the company filed a petition under the Bankruptcy 
Code of 1978. The bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid and recover from 
lenders with insider guarantees all payments made between ninety days 
and one year prior to the filing. The bankruptcy court dismissed the 
action based upon the trustee's failure to state a claim upon which relief 
. could be granted. 5 On an interlocutory appeal, the decision was reversed 
and remanded by a federal district court. 6 The Seventh Circuit Court of 
1. The term "insider" includes officers of the debtor corporation and the relatives of an 
officer. 11 U.S.c. § 101(30)(B)(ii)(vi) (1988). 
2. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). 
3. Id. at 1187. The insiders consisted of the firm's president, Richard N. Deprizio, and 
his brothers. Id. 
4. Id. The legal difficulties involved an investigation by the United States Attorney 
into allegations of affiliations with organized crime. The legal difficulties were par-
tially resolved in January 1986, when Richard Deprizio was assassinated in a vacant 
parking lot. Id. 
5. In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co., 58 Bankr. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986). The deci-
sion by the bankruptcy court was grounded on the so called "two-transfer" theory. 
Under this theory, payments made to lenders holding insider guarantees constitute 
two transfers: the first transfer is to the lender in satisfaction of the debt, subject 
only to a ninety day avoidance period; the second transfer, constituting the benefit 
to the inside creditor, is the only transfer potentially avoidable during the expanded 
preference period. The two-transfer theory is discussed infra in notes 19-36 and 
accompanying text. As an alternative holding, the bankruptcy court invoked con-
siderations of equity as a basis for dismissing the complaint. Id. at 480-81. The 
equitable theory is discussed infra in notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
6. In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co., 86 Bankr. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
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Appeals granted leave to appeal. The court affirmed with respect to ordi-
nary lender/creditors and reversed with respect to payments made to sat-
isfy certain pension and tax obligations.7 The decision marks the first 
time that a federal appeals court has applied a literal reading of the 
Bankruptcy Code to hold that payments made to creditors who have 
dealt at arms length with a debtor are subject to an extended preference 
period and recovery from the creditors, when insiders have guaranteed 
the debts. 
The straight-forward analysis that led the Seventh Circuit to this 
extraordinary result begins with section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.8 
This section of the Code allows a trustee to avoid any transfers, made 
within ninety days preceding the filing of the petition, that preferentially 
benefit a creditor.9 When the creditor is also an insider, the period of 
avoidability extends to include the entire year preceding the filing of the 
petition. 10 
Upon confirming that the transfers made to lenders with insider 
guarantees might be avoidable,11 the Seventh Circuit next addressed on 
7. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). 
8. The pertinent text of § 547 provides that: 
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may 
avoid any transfer ... 
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before 
such transfer was made; 
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion; or 
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing 
of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer 
was an insider; and 
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor 
would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; 
(B) the transfer had not been made; and 
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent pro-
vided by the provisions of this title. 
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). The Bankruptcy Code was amended in 1984. The prior 
version of § 547(b) required the insider have reasonable cause to believe the debtor 
was insolvent at the time of the transfer. 11 u.s.c. § 547(b) (1982). The prior 
version of § 547(b) applied in Levit because the case was filed in 1983. Neither 
party, however, appears to have raised the issue of whether the insiders had reason-
able cause to believe the debtor was insolvent. 
9. II U.S.c. § 547(b) (1988). A "creditor" is any entity that has a claim against the 
debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) (1988). Any right to payment, whether or not the 
right is contingent, is a "claim." Id. § 10 1 (4)(A). 
10. 11 U.S.c. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988). If the guarantor is forced to pay because the 
debtor has defaulted, the guarantor may attempt to recover from the debtor the 
amount paid. Thus, the insider guarantor is a creditor of the debtor. See In re V.N. 
Deprizio Constr. Co., 86 Bankr. 545, 548 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
11. Ultimately, the avoidability of any transfer depends upon whether the circum-
stances of the transfer are within any of the exceptions in § 547 of the Code. 11 
U.S.C. § 547(c) (1988); see also infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. 
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whom the burden of avoidance should fall. The heart of the court's opin-
ion was its subsequent analysis of section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
which governs transferee liability. Section 550 provides that the trustee 
may recover the property transferred or its value from (1) the initial 
transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer 
was made, or (2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial 
transferee. 12 
Literal application of section 550 results in equal liability of the 
lender and the insider guarantor. 13 At first impression, it appears incon-
gruous that a disinterested financial institution, dealing in good faith and 
at arms length, could be liable for payments made throughout an ex-
tended preference period solely because the lender obtained a personal 
guarantee-one of the most common forms of credit support. The Sev-
enth Circuit harmonized the apparent incongruity by an examination of 
the manifest intent of the Code and the realities that lay behind the 
lender's bargain with the debtor. 
Initially, the court reviewed the two-fold purpose of the trustee's 
avoiding powers: first, to provide a disincentive for creditors' rushing to 
attach assets within the ninety days preceding the debtor's filing; second, 
to reassure creditors acting with restraint that they will not suffer from 
their inaction, or as the Seventh Circuit phrased it, that "the pickings of 
anyone less civil will be fetched back into the pOt."14 The court observed 
that the purpose of the extended preference period for insiders is to neu-
tralize self-serving behavior by insiders, made possible by the insiders' 
greater knowledge of the debtor's financial situation and their greater 
control over the conduct of the debtor's business. I5 The Seventh Circuit 
concluded that a literal reading of section SSG-giving the trustee the 
option of collecting from either a creditorllender or the insider guaran-
tor-advances the purposes of both the avoidance powers and the ex-
tended insider preference period. 16 The court recognized that allowing a 
trustee to recover only from the insider could further some of the under-
lying purposes of sections 547 and 550. The court observed, however, 
that the effectiveness of allowing recovery only from insiders is limited by 
the difficulties of valuing a released guaranteel7 and a tendency for the 
insiders to prefer risking actions by the trustee than by the "hounds of 
the outside creditors."18 Thus, the court began its application of section 
550 with a policy examination that left the court completely poised to 
12. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988). 
13. The lender is liable in its capacity as the initial transferee of the avoided payments; 
the insider guarantor is liable as the party benefited by the payment. 
14. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1194 (7th Cir. 1989). 
15. /d. 
16.Id. 
17. One reason a released guarantee may be difficult to value is because at least part of 
the debt would have been paid during the regular course of business or in a liquida-
tion proceeding notwithstanding the preferential payoff. 
18. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1194. 
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endorse the literal application of the Code. The creditors in Levit ad-
vanced a "two-transfer" theory19 and policy considerations as justifica-
tions for avoiding the literal interpretation of section 550.20 The Seventh 
Circuit, however, rejected both arguments. 
According to the two-transfer theory, the payment by debtor to 
lender in satisfaction of the primary indebtedness is the first of two simul-
taneous transfers. The second transfer-the only one that creates an 
avoidable preference-is from the debtor to the insider guarantor in sat-
isfaction of the guarantor's contingent liability.21 According to this the-
ory, therefore, recovery is appropriate only from the insider guarantor 
since it is the only transfer that can be avoided on the basis of a benefit 
received by the insider. 22 
The two-transfer theory hinges on equating "benefit received" with 
"transfer."23 The Seventh Circuit noted that the difficulty with this the-
ory is that the Code already has defined a transfer, from the perspective 
of the debtor, as the "disposing of or parting with property or with an 
interest in property."24 In comparison, according to the two-transfer 
theory, there is a disparity between the property parted with and the 
property received by the lender in the first transfer. The difference be-
tween the property disposed of and that which is received is reflected in a 
separate transfer to the guarantor. This second transfer, the reduction in 
contingent liability (arguably an "interest in property") received by the 
guarantor, is a by-product of the first transfer. 25 Thus, under the two-
transfer theory, the payment to the lender consists of one property trans-
fer and two transfers of an interest in the property.26 Conceptualizing 
the interest received in the property as split between the lender and the 
insider guarantor requires that "transfer" be defined from the creditor's 
point of view.27 The district court in Deprizio pointed out that if Con-
19. The two-transfer theory has been accepted by a number of courts. See In re V.N. 
Deprizio Constr. Co., 58 Bankr. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986), rev'd, 86 Bankr. 545 
(N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989); In re 
Midwestern Cos., Inc., 96 Bankr. 224 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (alternative hold-
ing), ajf'd, 102 Bankr. 169, appeal docketed, No. 89-1877 (8th Cir. June 6, 1989); In 
re Mercon Industries, Inc., 37 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); see also In re 
Compton Corp., 831 F.2d 586, 591-96 (5th Cir. 1987) (approving two-transfer the-
ory to protect initial transferee when third party benefits). 
20. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1195, 1198. 
21. It is the satisfaction of the guarantor's contingent liability that is the "benefit" trans-
ferred to the insider guarantor. 
22. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1195. 
23.Id. 
24. Id. (paraphrasing 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1988». 
25. Id. at 1195-96; see also Note, The Interplay Between Sections 547(b) and 550 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 89 COL. L. REV. 530, 534-36 (l989)[hereinafter Note, The Inter-
play Between Sections 547(b) and 550]. 
26. This is in contrast to the mere conduit exception, which involves two transfers of 
property and only one transfer of an interest in property. For further discussion of 
the "mere conduit" theory, see infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. 
27. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1195; see also Note, The Interplay Between Sections 547(b) and 
550, supra note 25, at 534-36. 
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gress had intended to define transfer from the recipient's perspective, it 
could have defined transfer as "receiving or acquiring property or an in-
terest in property. "28 
Another difficulty with the two-transfer theory noted by the district 
court lies in the express recognition in section 550 that one transfer may 
benefit an outside creditor and an insider guarantor. 29 Because section 
550 recognizes that a single transfer can consist of more than one bene-
fit,30 it would be inconsistent for Congress to have intended under section 
547 that one payment consist of two transfers, just because the single 
payment confers two benefits.31 
The creditors attempted to justify reading two transfers into section 
547 on the basis of legislative history.32 The 1978 Code separated for the 
first time the identification of avoidable transfers from the identification 
of those who must pay for avoided transfers.33 The creditors argued that 
an absence of legislative history indicated that the previous practice of 
allowing recovery of avoided transfers only from those who received a 
preference should continue.34 In rejecting this approach, the Seventh 
Circuit stated that silence in the legislative history neither required nor 
authorized a court to depart from the text or structure of the Code.3s 
Additionally, the court reiterated its position that reading the Code ac-
cording to its ordinary meaning was completely consistent with the 
Code's policy of maximized equitable distribution among creditors of the 
same class. 36 
The creditors argued against literal interpretation as being a poor 
business policy that would lead to precipitous bankruptcy filings result-
ing from nervous creditors hastening to shore up their positions.37 The 
Seventh Circuit, apparently relying in great measure on its prior review 
of the purposes underlying the preference avoidance and recovery sec-
tions of the Code, discounted the creditors' predictions.38 Pointing to the 
28. In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co., 86 Bankr. 545, 551 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
29.Id. 
30. This conclusion follows from the dichotomized recovery, under § 550, from either 
the initial transferee or the party benefitted. Id. The initial transferee would not be 
a "transferee" but for being the recipient of an "interest in property." This interest 
in property must confer some benefit or the reach of § 550 extends to the absurd. 
See Bonded Financial Services, Inc. v. European American Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 
893-94 (7th Cir. 1988) (Hypothesizing potential liability of armored car companies 
or even banking intermediaries when "transferee" is treated as "anyone who 
touches the money. "); see also discussion of the mere conduit exception, infra notes 
76-81 and accompanying text. 
31. See In re V. N. Deprizio Constr. Co., 86 Bankr. 545, 551 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
32. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1196-97. 
33.Id. 
34.Id. 
35. Id. at 1197. 
36.Id. 
37. Id. at 1198. 
38.Id. 
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mitigating effects of the numerous exclusions and exceptions,39 the court 
directed further complaints to Congress.40 
Though the argument was not before the court, the Seventh Circuit 
also discussed and rejected equitable considerations as a possible grounds 
for avoiding the literal language of the Code.41 Noting that a number of 
decisions,42 and several commentators,43 have rejected literal application 
on the basis of equity, the Seventh Circuit nonetheless refused to tamper 
with the unambiguous language of the Code.44 The Seventh Circuit ob-
served that whatever equitable powers a bankruptcy court may wield, 
they must be limited to the "confines of the Bankruptcy Code."45 Prior 
courts have extended their powers of equity to avoid punishing a lender 
for exercising prudence in obtaining a guarantee.46 The Seventh Circuit, 
by contrast, articulated a cogent explanation for Congress' desire to have 
the statute implemented as written.47 The Seventh Circuit considered 
the literal application of section 550 in the context of the financial reali-
ties that underlie the extension of a personal guarantee. 
The presence of a guarantee creates an identity of interests between 
the lender and the insider guarantor.48 It is precisely this identity of in-
terests that gives a personal guarantee by an insider its value as credit 
support, for a guarantee from an otherwise impoverished insider is of 
little use. The "innocent" lender, therefore, is attempting to capitalize on 
the insider guarantor's natural inclination to minimize personal expo-
sure, to the detriment of other creditors.49 Viewed from this perspective, 
the apparently "inequitable result" of literal application of the Code ap-
39. For further discussion of the "ordinary course," and other exclusions, see infra 
notes 82-86 and accompanying text. 
40. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1200. 
41. Id. at 1197-98. 
42. Cases in which courts invoked their equitable powers to avoid literal application of 
the Code include: In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc., 96 Bankr. 77 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
1989) (alternative holding); In re Midwestern Cos., Inc., 96 Bankr. 224 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd, 102 Bankr. 169, appeal docketed, No. 89-1877 (8th Cir. June 
6, 1989); In re CoL Cartage Co., 70 Bankr. 928 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987); In re 
Aerco Metals, Inc. 60 Bankr. 77 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); In re R.A. Beck Builder, 
Inc., 34 Bankr. 888 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983); In re Duccilli Formal Wear, Inc., 8 
Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1180 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Cove Patio Corp., 19 
Bankr. 843 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). 
43. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 550.02, at 550-58 (L. King 15th ed. 1989); see 
also Countryman, The Trustee's Recovery in Preference Actions, 3 BANKR. DE-
VELOP. J. 449, 464 (1986). 
44. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d at 1197-98. 
45. Id. (quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963, 969 (1988». 
46. In re Aerco Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr. 77, 82 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985). 
47. Only two commentators previously had expressed the same view. See Nutovic, The 
Bankruptcy Preference Laws: Interpreting Code Sections 547(c)(2), 550(a)(l), and 
546(a)(l), 41 Bus. LAW. 175, 186-99 (1985); see also Pitts, Insider Guaranties and 
the Law of Preferences, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 343 (1981) [hereinafter Pitts, Insider 
Guaranties]. 
48. Both the lender and the inside guarantor share an interest in the debtor repaying the 
loan. See Pitts, Insider Guaranties, supra note 47, at 354. 
49.Id. 
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pears, instead, to be the fair result of a lender's choice to align itself with 
the baser instincts of those in control of the debtor corporation. 50 As the 
Seventh Circuit stated, "rules of law affecting parties to voluntary ar-
rangements do not operate 'inequitably' in the business world-at least 
not once the rule is understood."51 
Another creditor that relies on an insider's instinct of self-preserva-
tion to ensure prompt payment on its claims is the United States Govern-
ment. Taxes paid by the corporation were held not subject to an 
extended preference period in Levit because the control person, though 
potentially liable for unpaid taxes, would have no subsequent claim 
against the corporation and thus would not be a "creditor."52 The 
trustee in Deprizio had argued that the United States, as tax collector, 
received preferential payments because insiders were personally liable 
under section 6672(a) of the Internal Revenue Code in the event that the 
debtor corporation did not pay over taxes. 53 The trustee argued that, 
because of the potential personal liability, the insider would have a con-
tingent claim against the corporation and, consequently, would be a cred-
itor of the corporation. 54 The Seventh Circuit refused to allow recovery, 
maintaining that no claim was created by this liability because the liabil-
ity was cast by the statute as a separate penalty to the responsible person, 
without creating a private right by the person against the corporation. 55 
As an alternative theory, the trustee argued that the responsible per-
son would have a claim against the corporation based upon a common 
law right of indemnity. 56 This argument was dismissed by the Seventh 
Circuit on the ground that any insider subjected to the penalty would 
have a degree of involvement and willfulness that would preclude indem-
nity at common law.57 The summary dismissal of the trustee's argu-
ments by the Seventh Circuit appears to be based on a modest distinction 
between contingent claims that are certain and those that are barely 
colorable. 58 
A further distinction between certain and colorable contingent 
claims was decisive in the trustee's attempt to recover payments made in 
50. Id. at 353-55. 
51. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1198 (7th Cir. 1989). 
52. Id. at 1191-92. 
53.Id. 
54. Id. The trustee relied on 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a), which provides that: 
Any person required to collect ... and pay over any tax imposed by this 
title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and 
pay over such tax ... shall ... be liable to a penalty equal to the total 
amount of the tax evaded ... . 
26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (1982). 
55. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1991-92. 
56.Id. 
57.Id. 
58. In this context, a barely colorable contingent claim could be defined as a claim for 
which, in the abstract, a theoretical argument can be made, although its successful 
application in the face of most facts would raise the most cynical brow. 
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the preceding year to pension and welfare funds. 59 The trustee argued 
that insiders in the firm were secondarily liable on these payments as 
well. 60 The Seventh Circuit held that payments made to funds holding 
notes co-signed by Deprizio were potentially avoidable and recoverable 
as if the funds were commercial creditors.61 The court disallowed recov-
ery from funds not holding insider guarantees, however, because the lia-
bility of the insiders and any right to reimbursement by the pension fund 
was speculative.62 The border between certain and barely colorable 
claims likely will become a major battleground if literal application de-
velops a significant following among other circuits. 
The Seventh Circuit foresaw little difficulty associated with requir-
ing the lender to shoulder the enhanced risk of an extended preference-
recovery period. The court reasoned that creditors could simply charge 
higher rates and monitor debtors more closely to compensate for the in-
creased risk. 63 Similarly, the court discerned no inequity in requiring a 
creditor to pursue the insider guarantor for recovered payments since 
that was part of the creditor's original bargain.64 Prospectively, lenders 
may be able to accommodate the expanded at-risk period in accordance 
with the "financial realities" and commercial perceptions articulated by 
the Levit court. Difficulties arise, however, when there is uncertainty 
about whether the new interpretation of the rule will be applied consist-
ently in other jurisdictions. 
The Seventh Circuit first raised the specter of literal application of 
sections 547 and 550 as dictum in Bonded Financial Services, Inc. v. Eu-
ropean American Bank 65 Thereafter, at least one federal district court 
found the approach taken by the Bonded Financial court persuasive and 
expressly followed "the Seventh Circuit's sound guidance for heeding the 
clear intent of Congress. "66 The district court decision in Deprizio 
59. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1192. 
60.Id. 
61. Id. 
62. /d. An insider could be a creditor only if the insider had secondary liability for 
pension fund payments and then an implied right of reimbursement. The Seventh 
Circuit was unpersuaded that the insiders had any liability. Insider liability for pen-
sion fund payments would arise, in theory, if the insider is an "employer" required 
to pay into the pension plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), 29 V.S.c. § 1145 (1982). /d. The court left the question to be explored in 
detail at remand, but observed that not all employers are required to make contribu-
tions to the funds and that several courts as well as the general counsel of the pen-
sion fund insurer had concluded that there was no secondary liability. Id. 
63. Id. at 1198-99. 
64.Id. 
65. 838 F.2d 890, 894-95 (7th Cir. 1988) (dictum). The Seventh Circuit in Bonded Fi-
nancial was concerned with recovery under section 550 of transfers avoided under 
section 548. In discussing the relative equities involved, the court hypothesized the 
insider guarantor problem as an illustration of a situation where equity would have 
little impact on statutory interpretation. Id. 
66. In re Robinson Bros. DriIIing v. First National Bank of Bethany, 97 Bankr. 77, 81 
(W.D.Okl. 1988), aff'd, 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989). The district court decision 
in Deprizio similarly has been cited with approval. See In re Coastal Petroleum 
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likewise was modeled after the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bonded Serv-
ices.67 Still another federal district court has cited with approval the Sev-
enth Circuit's rejection of the two-transfer theory.68 The temporal 
proximity of these decisions may be an indication that literal application 
of the Code is gaining attraction. An appeal from a decision rejecting 
literal interpretation, however, presently is pending before the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.69 
The Fourth Circuit never has focused on the interplay between sec-
tions 547(b) and 550. The court, however, has addressed some periph-
eral issues in two cases involving preferential transfers. 7o In Aulick v. 
Largent,?l the Fourth Circuit considered whether a transfer of property 
to one creditor in exchange for that creditor's endorsement of a note to a 
second creditor was an avoidable preference to the second creditor. The 
court concluded that it was, and allowed recovery from the second credi-
tor.72 The court indicated in dicta that the transfer to the first creditor 
was not avoidable because it was part of a contemporaneous exchange. 73 
The ultimate result in Aulick was, in a sense, an avoidance of the 
transfer to the endorser (the first creditor). The second creditor was 
forced to return the endorser's money to the debtor's estate and the 
debtor's estate returned it to the endorser contemporaneously with a re-
turn of the security from the endorser to the debtor's estate.74 The 
Fourth Circuit intimated, however, that the contractual obligation be-
tween the first and second creditor remained, though the court refrained 
from deciding the issue of ultimate liability.75 The undecided issue of 
ultimate liability renders the dicta indicating that the transfer to the en-
dorser was not avoidable more confusing than helpful in predicting a 
Fourth Circuit response to presentation of the Levit issue. 
The peculiar circumstances within the Fourth Circuit's considera-
tion in the second case similarly hamper its predictive utility. The case, 
In re Harbour,?6 involved a debtor who made a series of large preferential 
transfers to his friend, using his friend's mother as a conduit. The 
friend's mother never inquired as to the reasons for her participation, 
derived no benefit from the transfers, and passed them immediately to 
Corp. 91 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); see also In re Installation Services, 
Inc., 101 Bankr. 282 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989) (citing and approving the district 
court's Deprizio decision). 
67. In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co., 86 B.R. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
68. In re H & S Transp. Co., 110 Bankr. 827 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). 
69. In re Midwestern Cos., 102 Bankr. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1989), appeal docketed, No. 89-
1877 (8th Cir. June 6, 1989). 
70. See Aulick v. Largent, 295 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1961); In re Harbour, 845 F.2d 1254 
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her son.77 The Fourth Circuit expressed broad approval for "cases 
which recognize that the initial recipient of a payment may not always be 
an 'initial transferee' for purposes of section 550(a)(1)."78 The equitable 
exception expressly recognized in the case, however, was the narrower 
circumstance of when the initial transferee functions as a "mere con-
duit," deriving no independent benefit from the transaction. The court 
refused to apply even the mere conduit exception in Harbour because of 
"aggressive ignorance" on the mother's part, which it likened to inequi-
table conduct. 79 
Unlike the two-transfer theory, in a mere conduit exception, there 
are, in fact, two transfers of the property, but only one transfer of an 
interest in the property. The current version of section 547(b) indicates 
that the only transfer that is avoidable is "an interest in property" falling 
within the proscribed circumstances.8o A conduit may handle the prop-
erty but the interest in the property moves from the debtor to the pre-
ferred creditor.81 
The equitable "exception" condoned by the Fourth Circuit does not 
appear to be an exception at all. Rather, it is an outcome consistent with 
the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code. Consequently, the accept-
ance by the Fourth Circuit of a mere conduit exception may provide only 
marginal insight into whether it would as eagerly embrace the two-trans-
fer fiction. Moreover, the ease with which the court rejected equitable 
consideration for the mother because of her inaction indicates a willing-
ness to hold the initial transferee to a strict standard in order to warrant 
equitable intervention. This standard is not likely to be met by a lender 
who benefits from a debtor's self-preferring behavior when the lender has 
provided the motivation for such behavior. 
If the Seventh Circuit decision in Levit evidences a new trend in the 
application of bankruptcy law, "financial realities" may need to be re-
shaped to better conform with judicial perceptions. Even if literal appli-
cation does not become widely accepted, a reevaluation of the utility of 
insider personal guarantees is in order. Any potential for a lender's expo-
sure to the one year look back period introduces a risk that increases the 
cost of the transaction. The measure of that risk must be ascertained in 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 1257. 
79.Id. 
80. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). 
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property. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5813 (definition of transfer inclUdes a transfer of 
custody because custody is an interest in property). This construction, however, 
would lead to absurd results for two reasons. First, there would be the problem of 
widespread liability. Banks, hotel safe keepers, postal service employees and others 
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interest, as to the intermediary, that would be avoidable would be custody. It makes 
little sense to attempt to avoid a transaction that, once custody is relinquished, is as 
if it never transpired. 
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order to accurately gauge the utility of a personal guarantee from an 
insider. Although lenders may not be able to anticipate the frequency 
with which the rule may be applied, they should be able to predict the 
effect of its application. Lenders can minimize the effect of literal appli-
cation by maintaining a prudent awareness of the limitations of prefer-
ence avoidance and recovery in addition to reviewing their policies 
regarding acceptance of personal guarantees from insiders. 
The Bankruptcy Code places limitations on the trustee's avoidance 
power that will act to minimize most lenders' exposure as a matter of 
course. 82 Transfers made in exchange for new value, for instance, are not 
avoidable. 83 Likewise, a transfer that does not improve the creditor's po-
sition over what it would be if the debtor had already filed for bank-
ruptcy is not avoidable. 84 Hence, if the lender is otherwise fully 
collateralized, the payments would not be avoidable because the insider 
guarantors would not benefit by receiving more than they would under a 
Chapter 7 liquidation. 
The most important limitation that will operate to minimize risk in 
many cases is the trustee's inability to avoid transfers made in the 
debtor's and creditor's usual course of business. 85 Thus, to the extent 
that payments were made on time, ordinary loan payments on an obliga-
tion secured by an insider's guarantee are secure from recapture.86 
Although lenders may be exposed to an extended voidable prefer-
ence period if they obtain guarantees from insiders, lenders can still bring 
an action against a credit-worthy guarantor to reclaim any recovered 
payments. Some caution in this area, however, is appropriate. Lenders 
should consider whether a guarantee from an insider who does not, and 
is not expected to, have any significant credit-worthiness is necessary. 
Boilerplate guarantees should be carefully reviewed and modified to en-
sure that the guarantor remains obligated for payments made by the 
debtor, but recovered after insolvency. One commentator suggests that 
lenders use a guarantee provision requiring the guarantor to waive any 
right of subrogation or other reimbursement against the debtor's estate 
arising out of the guarantor's satisfaction of the debtor's obligation.87 By 
this mechanism the insider no longer would be a contingent creditor and 
only the ninety day recovery period would apply.88 Lenders should be 
especially aware of the heightened risk they are taking if the only value of 
a guarantee is that it will serve as an incentive to a related borrower to 
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make its payments.89 Lenders may want to consider obtaining a guaran-
tee from a non-insider, or other credit support such as a letter of credit or 
a pledge of collateral. 90 
The implications of the Levit decision reach equipment lessors, land-
lords, pension funds and private parties as well as commercial lenders. 
Any party contemplating an advance of credit based, in whole or in part, 
on the strength of a personal guarantee from an insider, and the party's 
counsel, should carefully monitor future developments in the case law in 
this area. 
The Levit decision's endorsement of literal application of section 550 
unquestionably affects the value of insider guarantees. The impact of this 
decision could be significantly lessened, however, if literal interpretation 
is uniformly applied. Because of the destabilizing effect of disaccord 
among the federal circuits, this issue should be addressed by the Supreme 
Court. In the interim, however, the Levit decision stands-as either a 
harbinger or an aberration. 
Chellis E. Neal 
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